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The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974
INTRODUCTION

The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 (APPA) 1
opens to public scrutiny and comment consent decrees2 filed in federal district court by the government as proposed settlements of public, civil antitrust suits.3 The APPA also requires a district court to
determine that such a consent decree is in the public interest4 before
the court enters the decree as a judgment.5
1. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982). The APPA is popularly known as the Tunney Act.
2. The consent decree has been described as "an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the Attorney General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct challenged by the Attorney General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, or related statutes." ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ix (Comm.
Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 REPORT]. See United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1
F.R.D. 424, 426 (N.D. Ohio 1940). See generally Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument
of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (1959).
3. Approximately 80% of the antitrust complaints filed by the Justice Department during
the period between 1955 and 1972 were terminated prior to trial by the entry of a consent
decree. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ao. NEWS 6535, 6536 [hereinafter cited as 1973 HOUSE REPORT]. See generally 1959 REPORT, supra note 2; M. GOLDBERG, THE CONSENT DECREE: ITS FORMULATION AND USE (Occasional Paper No. 8, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Graduate School of
Business Adminstration, Michigan State University, 1962) [hereinafter cited as M. GOLD·
BERG]; W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-97, 126-29 (TNEC Monograph No.
16, 1940); Barnes, The Trial of an Antitrust Case by the Department of Justice: Settlement By
Consent Judgment, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 235 (Section of Antitrust Law, ABA 1958);
Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1053 (1963); Dabney,Antitrust
Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?, 68 YALE L.J. 1391 (1959); Donovan & McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Eeforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 46 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1933); Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Eeforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53
IOWA L. REV. 983 (1968); Handler, Twenty-Fourth AnnualAntitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
l, 19-34 (1972); Kalodner, Consent Decrees as an Antitrust E'!forcement Device, 23 ANTITRUST
BULL. 277 (1978); Katz, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration, 53 HARV. L. REV. 415
(1940); Litvack, Consent Decrees in Government Civil Antitrust Actions, 9 N.Y.L.F. 181 (1963);
Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Eeforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39 (1961);
Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and
Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163;
Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1967); Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust D17emma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 627
(1965).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982).
5. The consent decree is a '1udicial act," United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115
(1932), which must be entered by the court, S. REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 SENATE REPORT], and which has the same legal effect on the defendant as a judgment in a fully litigated action. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See also notes
100-01 infra and accompanying text. This Note will not discuss the post-judgment enforcement aspect of a court's review of consent decrees. For a discussion of that topic, see Note,
Nonparty Eeforcement of Antitrust Consent Decrees Through Contempt Proceedings, 64 GEO.
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Courts faced with this task have used differing standards of judicial review. Some have been deferential, expressing their reluctance
to question the Justice Department's wisdom in formulating each
settlement, at least in the absence of any showing of bad faith or
malfeasance. 6 However, in one recent decision, United States v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,1 a district court subjected a
consent decree to intense review. 8 The AT&T court independently
determined the conditions necessary to protect its own view of the
public interest. Then, after closely evaluating the individual terms of
the proposed settlement, it conditioned approval of the decree on the
parties' acceptance of modifications that satisfied the court's criteria
for protecting the public interest.9 This more intense review by the
AT&T court has created uncertainty over the proper scope of judiL.J. 769 (1976). See also Duncan, Post-Litigation Resultingftom Alleged Non-Compliance with
Government Antitrust Consent .Decrees, 8 W. RES. L. REV. 45 (1956).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.) ("The balancing of
competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be
left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. . . . The court's role in
protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty
to the public in consenting to the decree."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v.
Associated Mille Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 42 (W.D. Mo. 1975) ("Indeed, a court's
power to do very much about the terms of a particular decree, even after it has given the decree
maximum, rather than minimum, judicial scrutiny, is a decidedly limited power. . . . Power
to reform the procedures under which consent decrees are actually negotiated is vested in the
executive and legislative branches, not the judicial."), ajfd., 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir.) ("[T]he
Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and
in determining what is in the public interest."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States
v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1141-42 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (Where there is no
claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government, the court will not assess the
wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting a ~nsent decree.); United
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975); cf. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v.
United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) ("(S]ound policy would strongly lead us to decline
appellants' invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and
accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so acting.").
See also notes 32-36 infra and accompanying text.
7. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,979 (D.D.C. 1982), ajfd. mem. sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, I03 S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
8. This Note uses the terms "deferential" and "intense" to represent the polar approaches
to the scope of judicial review. Neither standard has an exact meaning, nor are the two exhaustive of all possibilities, but the terms serve as useful and contrasting paradigms. A deferential
court is largely passive; its only independent role is to assure that the parties have complied
with the procedural requirements of the APPA and perhaps that the government has acted in
good faith in reaching the settlement. A deferential court is unwilling to substitute its own
view of adequate relief for the Justice Department's, even if the court believes the Department
has erred. The Supreme Court's dictum in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S.
683,689 (1961), discussed at notes 84-88 infra, exemplifies the deferential standard of review.
At the other end of the spectrum, the court not only ensures compliance with the procedural requirements but also examines the substance of the decree. The court is willing to
substitute its own view of adequate relief and of the public interest for the Justice Department's, i.e., its determination of the public interest is independent of that made by the Justice
Department. The approach of the AT&T court exemplifies the intense standard of review.
9. See notes 37-52 infra and accompanying text.
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cial review under the APPA. 10
In the wake of this uncertainty, this Note analyzes the proper
scope of judicial review of consent decrees. The Note argues that to
further the policies embodied in the APPA, courts should undertake
intense review of proposed settlements before entering them as final
judgments. Both the congressional intent in enacting the APPA and
the public's interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust laws
support intense judicial review. The Note then demonstrates that
the deferential standard that some courts have applied is derived
mainly from a case that is inapplicable to the review of consent decrees. Finally, the Note argues that intense review will not entail
any significant disadvantages.
I.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSENT
DECREES UNDER THE APPA

A. .Description of the APPA

The APPA requires the Justice Department to follow certain procedures when it files a proposed consent decree with the court. Any
proposed settlement must be accompanied by a "competitive impact
statement" (CIS), 11 which describes the proposal and its anticipated
effects on competition. 12 The CIS must also explain the reasons for
bringing the suit and the violations originally alleged, 13 state the
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1982; at DIS, col. l; Natl. L.J., Aug. 23, 1982, at 3, col.
1. Two APPA decisions after AT&T did not adopt its intense standard of review. In United
States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court
followed the "within the reaches of the public interest" standard announced in United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975). See note 41 iefra. TheAmerican Brands court
also cited the National Broadcasting and Bechtel cases, both examples of judicial deference.
See nole 6supra. In United States v. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~
65,175, at 71,653 (C.D. Cal.), mod!fied, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,088 (C.D. Cal. 1982),
the court did not discuss the scope of its public interest determination but simply relied on the
government's "exhaustive explanation" of why the proposed decree would be in the public
interest.
1 I. Congress designed the competitive impact statement to help focus the attention of the
negotiating parties on the factors that Congress has determined should be considered in formulating a decree. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,674 (1972) (statement of Sen. Tunney). In this respect,
the CIS is much like the environmental impact statement (EIS) required from government
agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1976). Both the EIS and the CIS require the government to take account of the public interest
in the early stages of its decisionmaking process. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,676 (1972). In contrast
with the NEPA EIS, however, the APPA CIS is prepared by the government without the benefit of public input, which under the APPA comes after the CIS is filed. The CIS serves as a
point of departure for public comment rather than as an informed assessment of the public
interest as does the EIS. Congress intended the APPA CIS to educate interested members of
the public about the proposed decree, thereby enabling them to make informed comments on
and objections to the proposal. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,674 (1972). The public's response, in turn,
"may well serve to provide additional data, analysis, or alternatives which could improve the
[proposed decree)." Id. at 31,675.
12. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b)(3) (1982).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)(l), (2) (1982).
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remedies available to potential private claimants in the event the decree is entered, 14 and give a description and evaluation of alternatives to the proposal actually considered by the Justice
Department. 15 Both the proposal and the CIS must be filed with the
district court and published in the Federal Register at least sixty days
before the effective date of the decree. 16 A summary of the proposal
and the CIS must be published in newspapers of general circulation
for seven days over a period of two weeks beginning at least sixty
days before the effective date of the decree. 17 The public may submit
written comments regarding the proposal during this period, and the
Justice Department must file with the court and publish in the Federal Register responses to such comments. 18
At the close of the public comment period, and before entering
the consent decree, the court is required to determine whether the
entry of the judgment would be in the "public interest." 19 The statute authorizes the court in its discretion to take testimony of government officials or expert witnesses, to appoint a special master, to
allow intervention or appearance of amicus curiae, and to take any
other action it deems appropriate20 to help it determine whether the
settlement is in the public interest. 21
Although the phrase "public interest" is not clearly defined, 22 the
statute lists factors that the court may consider in making its public
interest determination. 23 The first group, listed in 15 U.S.C.
14. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b)(4) (1982).
15. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b)(6) (1982).
16. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b) (1982).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c) (1982).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1982).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982).
20. ~5 u.s.c. § 16(f) (1982).
21. See 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONO. &
AD. NEWS at 6538-39. See also 119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
22. Congress recognized "that the content of the phrase, 'public interest,' is a product of
judicial construction . . . ," thereby granting to courts the power and responsibility to develop
the definition of "public interest" on a case-by-case basis. 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3,
at 11-12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6542. See also Zimmer & Sullivan,supra note 3, at 186 (although the APPA does list factors for the court to consider (see text
accompanying notes 32-37 infra), "it nevertheless provides the court with no guidance as to
when a settlement is in the public interest - that is, how the relevant factors are to be weighed
in the balance.").
23. The section provides that in making its public interest evaluation, the court may consider(I) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated
effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing
upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982).
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§ 16(e)(l), contains "competitive"24 factors: the competitive impact
of the judgment, the anticipated effects of alternative remedies that
the Department actually considered, and any other considerations
that bear on the adequacy of the judgment.25 Subsection (e)(2) contains "general public impact" 26 factors: the effect of the judgment on
the public generally and on potential private claimants, including
consideration of the public benefit to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.27 Finally, the APPA does not constrain the
court to consider the public interest only from the standpoint of particular antitrust statutes. The court may also take into account "nonsubstantive reasons inherent in the process of settling cases through
the consent decree procedure." 28
24. The language used in this first group evidences a congressional intent to urge an evaluation of the legal and economic implications of a proposed decree from the perspective of the
antitrust laws. These factors bear on the "competitive impact" of the judgment. The Judiciary
Committee explained that it substituted the word "competitive" for the word "public" in the
phrase "public impact" throughout the bill. This substitution was made because: "(a) the
antitrust laws protect and promote competition; (b) the expertise the Antitrust Division is
charged by the Congress with institutionalizing focuses on 'competitive' effects . . . ." 1973
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 6542.
Therefore, whenever a court evaluates the "competitive impact" of a proposed settlement, it
should consider the extent to which the proposed relief satisfies the antitrust laws.
25. The deviation between the relief originally sought and the terms of the decree would
presumably be an especially significant factor. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act:
Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly efthe Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. HEARINGS ON
APPA] (statement of James S. Campbell, attorney, Washington, D.C.). See also United States
v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn., 307 F. Supp. 617,621 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (The court found "no good
reason" to reject the decree as contrary to the public interest, particularly since it "provide[d]
the Government with substantially all the relief that it could have obtained if it had tried the
case and won."), qffd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248
(1970).
26. Senator Tunney included this second category to direct the court to "consider both the
narrow and the broad impacts of the decree." 118 CONG. Rec. 31,675 (1972). "Thus, in addition to weighing the merits of the decree from the viewpoint of the relief obtained thereby and
its adequacy, the court is directed to give consideration ... to the effect of entry of the decree
upon private parties aggrieved by the alleged violation and upon the enforcement of the antitrust laws generally." Id
27. Senator Tunney pointed out two situations in which the public might benefit from a
determination of the issues at trial. The first would be if the case presented issues of particular
value as precedent. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,675 (1972). The second would occur if the Government were the only party with sufficient resources to obtain a litigated judgment against the
defendant in a case where the damage to private claimants was significant. Id Since consent
decrees have no prima facie effect in favor of the plaintiff in subsequent private suits, see notes
74-76 infra and accompanying text, the removal of the Government as plaintiff through entry
of such a decree could have a profound impact on the ability of private plaintiffs to recover for
their injuries. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,675 (1972). Although such a result is a factor that a court
should consider in evaluating the merits of a decree, the Co=ittee Report on the APPA
emphasizes that this section is not intended to force the government to go to trial for the
benefit of potential private plaintiffs. In most instances the interests of private parties can be
accommodated without the risks and costs of the government going to trial. 1973 House REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6538-39.
28. 1973 House REPORT, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
News at 6542. The Judiciary Co=ittee specifically deleted the words "as defined by law"
from the original phrase "public interest as defined by law" to allay the fear that the original
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B. Judicial Review of Consent Decrees

Courts have approached their statutory duty29 to determine
whether a proposed decree is in the public interest with varying degrees of independence and vigor. Where no objections have been
raised during the comment period, courts have generally entered the
judgment as proposed by the parties.30 Some courts faced with third
party objections have prodded the parties to deal with the objections
by offering "suggestions" for modification.31 When pressed to make
the public interest determination, however, most courts have applied
a passive standard of review. 32 These courts have shown considerable deference to the Justice Department's conclusions regarding the
public interest,33 particularly in cases where the relief embodied in
the decree mirrors that sought in the original complaint. 34 The
court, under this approach, must assure only that the Justice Department has acted in good faith in reaching a settlement.35 The "balancing of competing social and political interests" involved in
settling an antitrust suit is thus "left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General."36
In sharp contrast to this deferential approach, theAT&T3 1 court
engaged in a more exacting scrutiny of the terms of the proposed
settlement.38 After reviewing comments, briefs, and oral arguments
phrase might be interpreted to mean public interest as defined by the antitrust laws, which "as
such would not admit of compromises made for non-substantive reasons inherent in the process
of settling cases through the consent decree procedures." Id. (emphasis added).
29. IS U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) ("Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the
United States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in
the public interest.") (emphasis added).
30. See Branfman,Anlilrusl Consent .Decrees-A Review and Evaluation ofthe First Seven
Years llnder'the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 303, 349 (1982).
Bui see id. at 349 n.179 (fwo courts requested more information from the parties in light of the
paucity of public co=ent).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975), discussed in
Branfman, supra note 30, at 333-34.
32. See, e.g. , Branfman, supra note 30, at 350 n.182; cases cited in note 6 supra.
33. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660,666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1141-45
(C.D. Cal. 1978). See also Branfman, supra note 30, at 350.
35. See cases cited in notes 6, 8 supra.
36. United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083
(1981). See also cases cited in note 6 supra.
37. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~64,979 (D.D.C.
1982), ajfd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
38. For other examples of a relatively intense scope of review, see cases cited in Branfman,
supra note 30, at 350 n.180; United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301
(W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432,434 (C.D. Cal. 1967)
(court rejected the second proposed decree and "outlined certain requirements it believed essential to any decree settling the case"), ajfd mem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
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from numerous third parties concerning the proposed settlement, as
well as voluminous submissions from the parties themselves,39 the
court refused to accept the proposal unless the parties agreed to its
independently developed series of modifications.40 In evaluating the
proposal, the court purported to follow a relatively deferential standard requiring the settlement to be" 'within the reaches of the public
interest.' " 41 The court, however, did not interpret this standard as
requiring deference to the Justice Department; rather, it followed the
congressional admonition to eliminate ''judicial rubber stamping of
proposals submitted to the courts"42 by the Justice Department. The
AT&T court therefore displayed little deference to the Justice Department's views, stating that it would not accept the Department's
settlement just because the settlement "somehow, and however inadequately, deal[t] with the antitrust and other public policy problems
• • • .'' 43 Rather, the court demanded a decree that "meets the requirements for an antitrust remedy-that is, ... effectively [opens]
the relevant markets to competition and [prevents] the recurrence of
anticompetitive activity, all without imposing 'undue and unnecessary burdens upon other aspects of the public interest . . . ."44
After applying this test to the individual terms of the proposed
decree, the court concluded that the relief negotiated by the Justice
Department in several specific areas did not adequately protect the
public interest. For instance, the proposed decree had prohibited
39. AT&T, 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,088 n.88, 73,084 n.65.
40. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,148-49.
41. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,087 (quoting United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713,
716 (D. Mass. 1975)). The Gillette case displayed less deference than the Bechtel and National
Broadcasting decisions, see note 6 supra, which the AT&T court also cited in support of its
standard of review. However, the Gille/le court did not go as far as AT&T; the Gille/le court
adopted an equivocal rather than an intense standard of review. It found that on the one hand,
"The legislative history shows clearly that Congress did not intend the court's action to be
merely pro forma, or to be limited to what appears on the surface. Nor can one overlook the
circumstances under which the act was passed, indicating Congress' desire to impose a check
... on the government's expertise . . . ." 406 F. Supp. at 715. But the court also found support for a deferential approach in the congressional admonition to review in " 'the least complicated and least time-consuming means possible.'" 406 F. Supp. at 715 (quoting 1973 HousE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6539). Faced
with what it regarded as conflicting co=ands, the Gille/le court adopted an equivocal standard of review:
It is not the court's duty to detefmine whether this is the best possible settlement that
could have been obtained if, say, the government had bargained a little harder. The
court is not settling the case. It is determining whether the settlement achieved is within
the reaches of the public interest.
406 F. Supp. at 716. The court's further resolution to "look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass," id., may be picturesque, but
it too fails to offer much guidance.
42. AT&T, 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,085.
43. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,087.
44. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,089.
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Bell Operating Companies45 from marketing equipment for use on
customers' premises.46 Although theAT&T court agreed that in theory such a restriction would operate to prevent anticompetitive behavior,47 the court disagreed with the Justice Department's
prediction that such anticompetitive behavior would actually occur
in this case in the absence of such a restriction. 48
The court modified the decree to exclude the marketing restriction and required the Justice Department to accept the modification
as a condition of the court's approval of the decree. 49 The court imposed this condition even though it made no finding of bad faith or
abuse of discretion on the part of the Justice Department in including the marketing restriction in the decree. so The court thus engaged
in a much more intense review than merely determining whether the
proposed decree was ''within the reaches of the public interest";51 it
abandoned the established practice of according deference to the
Justice Department in reviewing proposed consent decrees. 52
II.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INTENSE AND INDEPENDENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREES

In enacting the APPA, Congress sought to establish "independent"53 judicial review of proposed consent decrees. As the previous
45. The most significant provision of the decree removed from the Bell System the function
of supplying local telephone services by divesting AT&T of its twenty-two Operating Companies that performed that function. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,095-101. This divestiture "will
make it impossible, or at least unprofitable, for AT&T to engage in anti-competitive practices,"
because AT&T will no longer be able to disadvantage competitors in the inter-exchange and
equipment markets by its close ties with the local Operating Companies. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at
73,099. The divestiture will also further the antitrust goal of preventing excessive concentration
of economic power in one company. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,097-98.
46. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,120.
47. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,120.
48. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,120. The court felt justified under the APPA to substitute its
own judgment for that of the Justice Department, an indication of the intensity of its review.
See note 8 supra.
49. The fact that the court removed a restriction from the Operating Companies' burden is
relevant in evaluating the tow degree of deference that Judge Greene displayed to the Justice
Department. Several courts have questioned whether the Justice Department negotiated
enough relief.see, e.g., United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432,434 (C.D. Cal.
1967) (second proposed decree), qffd mem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968), but theAT&T case may be the first time a court has questioned the
Justice Department for negotiating too much relief. Judge Greene evaluated each provision of
the decree from the standpoint of the public interest without regard to whether his modifications would be "more lenient" on the defendants than the Justice Department's proposal. This
approach supports the conclusion that his evaluation was truly independent of the Justice Department's and highlights the low degree of deference paid to the views of the Department.
50. Compare the cases cited in note 6 supra (suggesting a deferential, good faith standard
for judicial review).
51. See note 41 supra.
52. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
53. 1973 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 5, at 4; see also 119 CoNo. REC. 3452 (1973) (state-
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section illustrates, however, most courts faced with proposed settlements have instead deferred in large degree to the Justice Department's conclusions regarding the public interest. Such a deferential
approach ignores the legislative history of the APPA and runs contrary to the goals of APPA public interest review. The protection of
the public interest through APPA review can best be accomplished
by a completely independent, intense, and thorough judicial assessment of the proposed settlement.
A. The Legislative History of the APPA
The legislative history of the APPA contains a congressional
mandate to increase the intensity of judicial review of proposed consent decrees. Congress was dissatisfied with the prior consent decree
practice54 and sought to improve it by correcting several specific
abuses. The first major abuse was the "excessive secrecy" that
shrouded the negotiation of consent decrees.55 This secrecy generally
undermined public confidence in the consent decree process, 56 and
specifically covered up errors or improprieties committed by the Justice Department. 57 The public notice and comment procedures dement of Sen. Tunney) ("[The court] has an independent duty to assure itself that entry of the
decree will serve the interests of the public . . . .").
54. The legislative history of the APPA refers to a number of settlements as "blatantly
inequitable and improper." 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973). See also 120 CONG. REC. 36,34243 (statement of Rep. Holtzman); 120 CONG. REc. 36,345 (1974) (statement of Rep. Gunter);
S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 76, 120, 142-43; Consent .Decree Bills: Hearings on
H.R. 9203, H.R. 9947, and S. 782 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 162-68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.
HEARINGS ON APPA].
55. 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
56. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,342 (1974) (statement of Rep. Seiberling); 120 CONG. REC.
36,343 (1974) (statement of Rep. Mezvinsky); 120 CONG. REC. 36,343-44 (1974) (statement of
Rep. Jordan); cf. 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6536-37 (APPA designed to improve public confidence).
57. Regardless of the ability and negotiating skill of the Government's attorneys, they
are neither omniscient nor infallible. The increasing expertise of so-called public interest
advocates and for that matter the more immediate concern of a defendant's competitors,
employees, or antitrust victims may well serve to provide additional data, analysis, or
alternatives which could improve the outcome.
119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney); see also 118 CONG. REC. 31,675
(1972) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Judge Skelly Wright, in his testimony during congressional
hearings on the APPA, articulated the same concern:
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, while no doubt among the most
competent and dedicated groups of professionals in Government service, nevertheless is
made up of human beings and, unfortunately, human beings occasionally make mistakes.
In approving a particular decree, the Justice Department attorneys may overlook certain issues, ignore certain concerns, or misunderstand certain facts.
s. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 146.
In addition to the possibility of mistake, the Justice Department might be swayed by the
"great influence and economic power" wielded by the parties with whom it negotiates. 1973
SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6537. See also 120 CONG. REC. 36,341 (1974) (statement of
Rep. McC!ory).

162

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:153

scribed above were designed to remedy the problem of secrecy.
Eliminating the problem of secrecy would have been only half a
solution without also addressing the problem of 'judicial rubber
stamping" of proposed settlements. 58 A major purpose of the public
comment procedures is to provide an opportunity to correct innocent
or culpable errors of the Justice Department, an opportunity that is
wasted by a deferential court. 59 Instead, the APPA casts the court in
an independent role as legal guardian of the public interest. 60 The
APPA public notice and comment procedures do not come into play
until after the government and the defendant have concluded their
negotiations and have lodged a proposed settlement with the court. 61
As a result, the statute does not require62 the government to consider
specific interests or complaints of third parties and of the public generally during the negotiation stage. 63 Only after a settlement has
been reached can the public voice its objections. Although in several
cases the Justice Department has responded to public comments by
renegotiating a particular decree, 64 only the court has the power to
force the Department to consider the public's comments by refusing
to enter a decree until the concerns are assuaged. 65 If the court sim58. "One of the abuses sought to be remedied by the bill has been called ~udicial rubber
stamping' by district courts of proposals submitted by the Justice Department." 1973 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6538.
59. Senator Tunney complained that "too often in the past district courts have viewed their
rules [sic-roles] as simply ministerial in nature - leaving to the Justice Department the role of
determining the adequacy of the judgment from the public's view." 119 CONG. REC. 3452
(1973).
60. The mandate is phrased first in general terms: Before entering any consent judgment, the court shall determine that entry of that judgment is in the public interest.
The mandate is a highly significant one because it states as a matter of law that the
role of the district court in a consent decree proceeding is an independent one. The court
is not to operate simply as a rubber stamp, placing an imprimature [sic] upon whatever is
placed before it by the parties. Rather it has an independent duty to assure itself that
entry of the decree will serve the interests of the public generally.
119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
61. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b) (1982).
62. The requirement of a competitive impact statement puts some pressure on the negotiating parties to consider the public interest during the negotiations. See note 63 infra and accompanying text. Without the benefit of public commentary, however, their ability to assess
accurately the many facets of the public interest may be limited.
63. One witness during the House APPA hearings suggested that Congress provide for
public co=ent to be directed toward the Justice Department rather than the court. See H.
HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 168 (testimony of Miles W. Kirkpatrick, attorney and
former chairman of the FTC). Representative Polk countered that such an arrangement could
not ensure that the Justice Department would seriously consider the public comments, id. at
177, and the idea was ultimately rejected.
64. See Branfman, supra note 30, at 330-31; H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 85.
65. The only power the court is given in equity and under the APPA is to refuse to enter a
decree that is not in the public interest. Some courts, however, have used this power as leverage to prod the parties into renegotiating. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. At least
one court, namely Judge Greene in the AT&T case, overcame the limits on this power by
stating that he would only accept a decree that included his specific modifications. See notes
37-52 supra and accompanying text.
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ply defers to the Justice Department, it abrogates its duty as protector of the public interest. Congress thus required the court "to make
a positive finding that the decree is in the public interest" in order to
remedy the abuse of judicial rubber stamping.66
B. Judicial Protection of the Public Interest
In addition to the specific concerns emphasized in the legislative
history of the APPA, several inherent features of the consent decree
process also support independent and thorough judicial review.
Consent decrees may have a great impact on the public at large
through their regulation of industrial conduct, deterrence of antitrust
violations, and permanence. Given this importance, it is imperative
that proposed consent decrees receive intense judicial scrutiny.
First, consent decrees often create a "follow-the-leader"67 effect
in a particular industry, effectively setting the standard of conduct
for the entire industry.68 Senator Tunney recognized that the widespread use69 of consent decrees to enforce our antitrust laws could
"have a very profound effect on the lives of every citizen of this
country," since "[t]he decision to settle a case, and the components of
that settlement, may affect the price, the quantity, and the quality of
the most basic commodities." 70
Second, consent decrees have a significant effect on the deterrence of antitrust violations. A consent decree all but eliminates the
possibility that a company engaged in practices of doubtful legality
will be held liable for resulting injuries to competitors in private
treble damages suits.71 Under section 5 of the Clayton Act,72 a final
judgment entered after trial in a public antitrust case may be used by
private claimants in treble damage suits as prima facie evidence
against the defendant as to all matters that would be estopped between the government and the defendant. 73 Consent decrees entered
66. District court judges shall be required to find that each proposed consent judgment is
in the public interest. The courts will thus be required to make a positive finding that the
decree is in the public interest . . . .
The committee believes this requirement will serve to remedy the so-called rubberstamping practice. It is hoped that flexible judicial procedure will evolve in the process of
correcting judicial rubberstamping.
120 CONG. REc. 36,344 (1974) (statement of Rep. Jordan).
67. Kalodner, supra note 3, at 278-79: "When industry leaders have entered consent decrees, others in the affected industry tend to conform to the decree . . . ."
68. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
69. See note 3 supra.
70. 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
71. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
73. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
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before testimony is taken do not have this prima facie effect. 74 Without the aid of the government's judgment as prima facie evidence, a
private claimant will find it extremely difficult to succeed in his
treble damage action.75 Thus, with the entry of a consent decree society loses the strongest deterrent in the antitrust laws. Finally, the
loss of the prima facie effect concomitantly deprives private citizens
of a means· for recouping their losses that result from the antitrust
violations.76 Since a consent decree may in practice constitute the
only remedy against an antitrust defendant's conduct,77 a court
should be certain that it sufficiently protects the public interest. 78 No
other means of protection are likely to be forthcoming.
The third reason for intense judicial scrutiny of proposed settlements serves to reinforce the first two. Consent decrees are permanent and have the same collateral estoppel and res judicata effects
against the government as do litigated judgments.79 If the government later wishes to modify a consent decree over the objection of
the defendant, the government must satisfy the stringent standard
established in United States v. Sw!ft & Co. :80
Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed
74. IS U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
Consent decrees will typically state that the parties have consented to entry without admitting any facts or legal conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Halliburton Co., 1976-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,954, at 69,225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
75. See, e.g,, 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. ("Because of the protracted nature of
antitrust litigation, with the expense and complexity of proof of the legal and economic issues
involved, it is difficult at best for a private citizen to prosecute to conclusion an action under
the antitrust laws. When the private litigant is deprived of the use of the Government's decree
as prima facie evidence, moreover, a private action becomes virtually impossible to maintain."); see also 119 CONG. REC. 345 l (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney) ("As a practical matter because of the protracted nature of antitrust litigation, and the deep pockets of many
corporate defendants, few private plaintiffs are able to sustain a case in the absence of parallel
litigation by the Justice Department."); M. GOLDBERG, supra note 3, at 68.
76. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22-24. Society also loses the value of a litigated judgment as precedent for future antitrust cases. 118 CoNG. REC. 31,675 (1972) (statement of Sen.
Tunney). Although potential violators within an industry may adjust behavior to account for
policies articulated through a consent decree against a competitor, the incentive to conform
anticompetitive conduct would presumably be greater in the face of legal precedent.
77. Senator Tunney expressed concern that "a bad or inadequate consent decree may as a
practical matter foreclose further review of a defendant's practices both inside and outside the
scope of the decree." 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973).
78. As Senator Tunney argued, "[g]iven the enormous amount of time and resources devoted to the prosecution of most antitrust suits, it is both logical and necessary that the end
result be as carefully considered as possible." 119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973).
79. See, e.g., Curry v. Curry, 79 F.2d 172, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ("For a consent decree,
within the purview of the pleadings and the scope of the issues, is valid and binding upon all
parties consenting, open neither to direct appeal nor collateral attack. 'A fortiori, neither party
can deny its effect as a bar of a subsequent suit on any claim included in the decree.'") (quot•
ing Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885)); see
also 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3.
80. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned. 81

This rigorous standard has made the modification of decrees after
entry virtually impossible. 82 Because any error is likely to be irreversible, a court should intensely scrutinize proposed settlements to
ensure that they adequately protect the public interest. 83
C. The Inapplicable Rationale for Judicial .Deference
Courts applying a deferential standard of review have ignored
relevant provisions in the legislative history of the APPA and the
policy reasons favoring intense review. Instead, these courts have
relied on Supreme Court dictum in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United
States 84 as support for their reluctance to add their independent
judgment to the settlement process. 85 In Sam Fox, the Supreme
Court upheld a district court's decision to deny intervention as of
right to private parties who claimed that the government, in negotiating and accepting a consent decree, had inadequately protected
their interests. 86 The Court said:
[S]ound policy would strongly lead us to decline appellants' invitation
to assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and
accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim
of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so
acting. 87

Although Sam Fox predated the APPA and dealt with intervention
rather than review of consent decrees, some courts have concluded
that its policy of deference to the Justice Department also applies to
APP A cases. 88
81. 286 U.S. at 119.
82. See, e.g., Note, Construction and Mod!ftciation ofAntitrust Consent .Decrees: New Approaches After the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of1974, 77 C0LUM. L. REV. 296, 30203 (1977).
83. Senator Tunney was sensitive to this concern when he proposed the APPA:
[T)he submission of the proposed decree to the court and its subsequent embodiment in a
jud~ent lends a permanence that endures long after the passing of a particular administration of the Department.
·
118 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1972). See also note 77 supra.
84. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
85. See note 88 infra.
86. 366 U.S. at 689.
87. 366 U.S. at 689.
88. The court in United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D.
Mo. 1975), qffd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976), concluded that its
duty under the APPA to determine whether the proposed settlement was in the public interest
was merely "an accurate codification of the existing case law." 394 F. Supp. at 44. The court
was thus "convinced that lower federal courts must follow the guidance of the dictum of (Sam
Fox)." 394 F. Supp. at 41; see note 87 supra. It was "equally convinced that Swift & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32, 48 S.Ct. 3.11, 317, 72 L.Ed. 587 (1928), still states the
applicable standard in regard to the broad scope of the Attorney General's discretion, i.e., 'His
authority to make determinations includes the power to make erroneous decisions as well as
correct ones.'" 394 F. Supp. at 41. The Milk Producers court believed that this interpretation
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A close reading of Sam Fox, however, reveals that its holding
and primary rationale do not apply to approval of proposed consent
decrees. The Sam Fox court based its denial of the appellants' request to intervene on the ground that the appellants were not bound
by the parts of the decree to which they objected and sought intervention to challenge.89 Hence, they could enforce their rights in private litigation. 90 This holding on the standard for third-party
intervention naturally does not control or address the proper judicial
role in reviewing proposed consent decrees, and its rationale also
loses force when taken out of context. The general public is deeply
affected by consent decrees, 91 and it is the public interest that the
court is charged with determining before it enters a decree. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself recognized in Sam Fox that, as a
practical matter, even any further private relief is highly unlikely, 92
was supported by the legislative history of the APPA, but the passages it cited merely help
delineate the boundaries of the court's inquiry without addressing the scope of that review.
See 394 F. Supp. at 44-45. Furthermore, the Milk Producers court totally ignored the repeated
mentions in the legislative history that the APPA was designed to correct the abuse of judicial
rubber-stamping, which was equated with judicial deference to the Attorney General. See
notes 58-60 supra.
The court in United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C,D. Cal.
1979), similarly concluded that the Sam Fox policy of deference "continues to apply with
equal force even after enactment of the [APPA]." 449 F. Supp. at 1141. In addition to relying
on the district court's opinion in Milk Producers for this conclusion, the NBC court also cited
part of the Eighth Circuit's Milk Producers opinion (449 F. Supp. at 1141-42):
It is axiomatic that the Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and in determining what is in the public interest. Thus, in
our view, the intervention standard remains that which was stated in Sam Fox: "[B]ad
faith or malfeasance on the part of the government" in negotiating and accepting a consent decree must be shown before intervention will be allowed. 366 U.S. at 689.
United States v. Associated Millc Producers, 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added), qffg. 394 F. Supp. 29, 44 (W.D. Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). This
passage certainly conveys a deferential tone, but reliance on it for the appropriate scope of
review is misplaced. First, it only speaks to the standard for a third party to intervene, not to
the scope of a court's review of a proposed consent decree. Second, the Eighth Circuit passage
itself reflects confusion of Sam Fox's intervention holding and its policy dictum. Compare
Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 689, with id. at 690-93.
Contrary to these conclusions by the Milk Producers and NBC courts, the AT&T court
correctly observed that in enacting the APPA "Congress rejected case law to the effect that
courts should not 'assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting [a] consent decree.'" AT&T, 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,085 n.74 (quoting Sam Fox, 366
U.S. at 689). See also Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 208, 210 ("[U]ntil recently, courts
routinely rubber-stamped proposed decrees . . . largely due to doubts about the wisdom of
reviewing Justice Department determinations. [The APPA], however, establishes a contrary
public policy." (footnotes omitted) ... The Milk Producers "court's approach seems fundamentally misconceived.'').
89. 366 U.S. at 689.
90. 366 U.S. at 689.
91. For example, in the AT&T case the structural relief negotiated by the Justice Department and approved by the court will have enormous impact on consumer phone rates nationwide. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1983, at 29, col. I; id., Feb. 12, 1983, at 29, col. I; see also
notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
92. [A]ppellants argue that even should they not be legally precluded from bringing a
private action, nevertheless the very existence of the outstanding decree would as a matter
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although private parties are technically not bound by consent decrees.93 Thus, a decision to enter a proposed decree, unlike a denial
of intervention, is a final94 disposition of the rights of the public.
The dictum in Sam Fox, however, suggests an additional rationale for deference: deference because the decisionmaker is another
branch of the government. The government's decision to enter into a
consent decree is "an administrative decision and . . . a part of the
implementation of the general policy of the Executive branch of government."95 Courts have historically been reluctant to review intensely the discretionary decisions of administrative bodies, 96
including the decisions of the Justice Department to settle antitrust
cases via consent decrees. 97
of comity either preclude further relief or operate to limit the relief some future- equity
court might decree. Although there is no reason why such a court need consider the
present decree as anything but a minimum towards insuring broader representation and
more favorable income distribution should a claim for further relief be made out, there is
considerable weight to the argument that the court will feel constrained as a matter of
comity to at least build on the foundations of the present decree.
366 U.S. at 694.
93. A consent decree bars private parties from suing for injunctive relief, but does not bar
private treble damage suits. Thus competitors will be bound to the structural relief approved in
the decree, and the defendant's conduct will also be effectively insulated from private damage
claims. See notes 76-78 supra.
94. Once a consent decree is entered, it is not subject to modification without the consent of
the parties absent some unusual change of circumstance. See notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text.
95. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn., 307 F. Supp. 617, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1969), ajfd.
per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961); Note, The l'IT .Dividend.·
Reform of .Department of Justice Consent .Decree Procedures, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 594, 600
(1973) [hereinafter cited as l'IT .Dividend].
97. See l'IT .Dividend, supra note 96, at 600, 610. This absence of judicial involvement in
the consent decree process prompted the 1959 House Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly to remark:
[T]he judicial function has been superseded by an administrative procedure in which
there are no administrative rules to safeguard the interests of the public or the interest of
parties not privy to the Government's case. The consent decree practice has established
an orbit in the twilight zone between established rules of administrative law and judicial
procedures.
1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
During congressional hearings on the APPA, several critics of the proposed act questioned
the propriety of empowering a judicial body to engage in the traditionally "executive" function
of determining the public interest. See, e.g., H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 205
(testimony of Milton Handler, Professor of Law, Columbia Univ.). Representative Hutchinson objected that the APPA "imposes on the courts what is essentially a nonjudicial function.
In short, the courts will have to decide whether the Department of Justice has exercised its
prosecutorial discretion to settle antitrust cases as well as it should. . . . In my opinion, such a
process is foreign to the judicial function." 120 CONG. REC. 36,340 (1974). Representative
Hutchinson further objected:
[T]o require federal courts to determine whether a consent decree is in the public interest
is to transfer an "executive" question to the courts for resolution. The question for the
court will be whether the Department of Justice has exercised its prosecutorial discretion
well or, perhaps, as well as possible. The question will not be whether the Department
has violated some legal standard. For none is established by this legislation. Rather, the
court is given a plenary and unqualified authority to re-decide an executive decision.
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This argument for deference, based on separation of powers, is
flawed, however, because it fails to distinguish between the Justice
Department's negotiation of a proposed settlement and a court's entry of a consent decree. Although negotiations involve "administrative decisions" by the Justice Department, a court's entry of a
consent decree is an exercise of a constitutional98 and statutory99 ju1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
6545 (Additional Views of Rep. Hutchinson) (emphasis in original). Representative Hutchinson argued that the legislative and executive branches, which are accountable to the electorate
rather than the courts, should determine what is ''wise or good for the American people." Id.
In dissenting from the Supreme Court's su=ary affirmance of the AT&T decision, Justice
Rehnquist agreed with Representative Hutchinson that the "question assigned to the district
courts by the Act is a classic example of a question co=itted to the Executive." Maryland v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (1983), qffg. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~64,979 (D.D.C. 1982).
This objection concerning delegation of an executive function to the judiciary goes beyond
the issue of the appropriate scope of judicial review. It goes to the constitutionality of the
APPA. If the Supreme Court found the objection persuasive, it would declare the public inter•
est determination required by the APPA unconstitutional, regardless of the standard of review.
The fatal flaw, if any, lies in the question the APPA asks the courts to answer, not in the way in
which the courts go about answering that question. Since under Justice Rehnquist's view the
judiciary cannot constitutionally make the public interest determination, neither the standard
of the AT&T court nor "any other standard the District Court could have devised, admits of
resolution by a court exercising the judicial power established by Article III of the Constitution." 103 S. Ct. at 1242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. The Constitution grants courts the power to decide "Cases, in . . . Equity, arising
under . . . the Laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. One co=entator has
argued that delegation of the public interest determination to the judiciary violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. H. HEARINGS ON APPA,supra note 54, at 205 (testimony of Milton Handler, Professor of Law, Columbia Univ.). See also note 97 supra.
The separation of powers doctrine prohibits one branch of government from acting in such
a way as to prevent another branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). The separation of powers
doctrine was originally premised on the notion that "each of the three general departments of
government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indi•
rect, of either of the others." Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). The
Supreme Court took a "more pragmatic, flexible approach" to separation of powers in Nixon,
supra, "reject[ing] the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of
authority between the three branches." 433 U.S. at 442-43. Rather, as the Court held in Nixon,
the test of whether the proper balance between the coordinate branches is disrupted by particular action focuses on the "extent to which it prevents the [other] Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions." 433 U.S. at 443.
Three arguments militate against the application of the separation of powers doctrine here.
First, the Supreme Court had a chance to strike down the public interest provision of the
APPA in theAT&T case but refused to do so, su=arily affirming the district court instead.
See note 97 supra. Second, judicial review of proposed consent decrees does not necessarily
"prevent[) the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443. If a court refuses to enter a consent decree, the Justice Department
merely loses but one enforcement option. The Department may still litigate the case, dismiss
the case, or settle the case by contract with the defendant. More importantly, the Department
can still renegotiate the decree and resubmit it for court approval. Thus, the court does not
prevent the Justice Department from enforcing the antitrust laws.
Third, the decree is subject to the court's inherent equitable power. See notes IO 1-03 1iifi'a.
In reviewing a proposed settlement, the court exercises its inherent power. Unless this power is
meaningless, the court's exercise of it cannot be an encroachment on the executive branch.
Indeed, a denial of the court's power to refuse to enter decrees that do not protect the public
interest might itself represent an unconstitutional infringement on judicial power under the
standard laid down in Nixon. Such a denial would arguably prevent the court from accom•
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dicial function. Since entry of a consent decree is a judicial act, 100
the decree is subject to the court's equitable power to refuse to enter
any judgment not "equitable and in the public interest." 101 Thus,
even apart from the APPA, the court's inherent equitable power
"over [its] own process, to prevent abuse, oppression and injustice"102 obviates the need for deference to the executive branch. The
court inherently possesses the power to review consent decrees intensively in making its public interest determination. 103
By entering a consent decree, a court concludes, pursuant to its
equitable responsibility, that the decree protects the public interest.
A Sam Fox standard, whereby a court would refuse to enter a decree
only if there were some evidence of bad faith on the part of the government, would be an abdication of that responsibility. 104 For a conplishing its constitutionally assigned function of enforcing the laws of the United States as a
court of equity. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
99. Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), and Section 15 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982), invest the district courts with jurisdiction "in equity to prevent and
restrain . . . violations" of the Acts. This equitable power to issue decrees extends to consent
judgments. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928). See also Katz, supra note 3, at
416-17.
100. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). See also Pope v. United States,
323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); note 5 supra.
Presumably, the Justice Department could settle its cases by contract with the defendant.
The Department insists, however, that all agreements be embodied in a court order. See /'IT
Dividend, supra note 96, at 613. In one case, the Department informed the court that "it was
its policy not to accept stipulations unless 'So Ordered' [although] [t]he Government does not
question the sincerity, willingness or ability of [the defendant] to carry out the terms of the
stipulation." United States v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH)
~ 73,751, at 91,183 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
101. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D. Del. 1942), appeal
dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943); see also Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 570
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A court of equity is not just an umpire between two litigants. In a very special sense, the public interest is in its keeping as the conscience of the
law."); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194 (1939) ("It is familiar doctrine that the
extent to which a court of equity may grant or withhold its aid, and the manner of moulding its
remedies, may be affected by the public interest involved."); 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3
("As a judicial act, the consent decree constitutes determination by the court that its content is
equitable and in the public interest.").
102. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888).
103. The fact that the court is to protect the public interest rather than some private interests provides additional support for intense review, since the court's inherent equitable powers
reach a maximum when the public interest is involved. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fedn.,
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) ("Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther
both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed
to go when only private interests are involved.").
104. Additional support for the proposition that the Sam Fox standard would be inappropriate to consent decree approval can be found by analyzing the wording of.the statute itself.
First, the public interest determination is mandatory. 15 U.S.C. § l6(e) (1982); see also 119
CONG. REC. 3453 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Neither the statute nor the congressional
reports indicate that a court should only evaluate a decree in instances where "bad faith" is
claimed. Second, the general phrasing of the statutory mandate, which requires a court to
deny entry of any Justice Department proposal not in the public interest, is inconsistent with
an approach that would limit judicial review to decrees allegedly negotiated in bad faith.
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sent decree that violates the public interest as a result of an error by
the Justice Department does not become less undesirable merely because the government negotiated it in good faith.
Ill.

POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF INTENSE JUDICIAL REVIEW

Commentators 105 and courts 106 have posited two disadvantages
that could ensue from intense judicial review. First, they have argued that intense review will undermine the consent decree's effectiveness as a device for the enforcement of the antitrust laws by
destroying the incentives to settle without trial. 107 Second, they have
argued that, as a practical matter, the courts lack the ability to make
an independent determination of the public interest. 108 Neither of
these objections provides a sufficient reason to reject intense judicial
review of proposed decrees. Indeed, intense judicial review may 'actually improve the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement.
A. Reduced Incentives To Settle
If the incentive for settlement actually decreased as the intensity
of judicial review of proposed settlements increased, judicial deference to the Justice Department would be appropriate. The Department's antitrust enforcement depends heavily on the consent decree
device. 109 Because it involves a settlement, a consent decree can further the goals of antitrust policy 110 at a significant savings of time
105. See, e.g., Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an l'?flationary Era, 50 N.Y. U. L,

REV. 211, 239 (1975).
106. See note 107 infra; cf. City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th
Cir. 1964) (discussing administrative advantages of nolo contendere pleas in criminal cases and
classifying such pleas with consent decrees).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975); Handler, supra note I05, at 243 (expressing the concern that the elaborate APPA procedures "cannot
but have a chilling effect on the normal processes of settling a civil action").
108. See, e.g., S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 71 (statement of Robert A. Hammond III, attorney).
109. See note 3 supra.
110. The Judgments Section of the Antitrust Division follows these broad purposes in developing decrees:
(I) To prohibit past illegal activities; (2) To prevent future violations of the antitrust laws;
(3) To restore competitive conditions; and (4) To deprive the defendants of the fruits of
their illegal acts.
Kilgore,Antitrust Judgments and 17zeir Eeforcement, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 331,338
(Section of Antitrust Law, ABA 1958). In light of the APPA provisions, the purpose "to protect the public interest" might be an appropriate addition to this list.
The consent decree is unique as an antitrust enforcement device because it can actually "go
beyond sheer prohibition; it can attempt to shape remedies to the requirements of industrial
order. . . . It can reach beyond the persons in legal combat to comprehend all the parties to
an industry." W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 3, at 88. See also 1959 REPORT, supra note
2, at 19.
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and resources for the Department and for the judiciary. 111 Thus, the
costs to the public of disincentives to settle would be substantial.
1.

Settlement Risks and Costs

The relative effects of independent and thorough judicial review
on incentives to settle are, however, minimal. For defendants, consent decrees represent a less costly, less time consuming, and less
disruptive alternative to litigation. 112 Further, by negotiating a settlement, the defendant avoids the risks associated with litigation, 113
most significantly, the prima facie effect of a govemmeD'.t judgment
in subsequent private treble damage suits. 114 These incentives to settle will be largely unaffected by the intensity of the court's review.
Nor does intense judicial review in itself increase the costs of settlement, thereby reducing the incentive to settle. The APJ>A public
notice procedures may increase the cost that accompanies a consent
settlement, 115 but these procedures must be complied with regardless
of the scope of the court's review. 116 Any additional costs unique to
intense judicial review are not likely to be substantial. 117
2. Equivalency of Relief

A disincentive to settle might also arise if the court substituted its
view of what would be proper final relief after a litigated judgment
for the Department's view of proper negotiated relief. Were the
court to condition its approval of a consent decree on the defendant's
acceptance of the court's relief, the defendant, from the point of view
of relief, would be no worse than if it had litigated and lost. The
defendant might therefore prefer to litigate instead of settle, gaining
111. One study suggests that consent decrees are entered in less than half the time it takes
fully to litigate an action. Barnes, supra note 3, at 237.
112. Kalodner, supra note 3, at 285; see also M. GOLDBERG, supra note 3, at 3.
113. Kalodner, supra note 3, at 285.
114. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), provides that a judgment
against a defendant in a public civil antitrust suit shall be prima facie evidence of antitrust
violations in subsequent private treble damage actions. This prima facie effect does not apply
to decrees entered before any testimony is taken. Consent decrees normally are entered with
no record and typically state that no evidence has been taken. See Kalodner, supra note 3, at
320 n.22; note 74 supra.
115. See Branfman, supra note 30, at 352-53; see also id. at 329 n.94 (Branfman notes that
the filing of comments by third parties increased the time between filing and approval by over
two months on the average. Presumably, defendants would incur costs during the delay.).
116. See United States v. Central Contracting Co., 527 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(court will not make any public interest determination until parties comply with the APPA
procedural requirements).
117. According to one study, consent decrees are entered in less than half the time it takes
to litigate an action fully. See note 111 supra. Given this enormous time differential, it is
unlikely that intense judicial review will greatly reduce the cost advantages of settlement, since
a court's review of a proposed decree is unlikely to take a long time. See also S. HEARINGS ON
APPA, supra note 25, at 116 (statement of Sen. Gurney).
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at least the possibility of victory at trial. 118
This argument, however, overlooks three considerations. First, a
proper application of an intense scope of review would not contain
this fault. Although Congress intended courts to be able to substitute their views of the public interest in the decree for the Department's, 119 it did not intend courts to insist on litigated rather than
negotiated relief. Accordingly, it commanded that the court "preserve the consent decree as a viable option." 120 Second, the strongest
incentive to settle 121 - freedom from the prima facie effect of a fully
litigated government judgment in future private treble damage actions -is unaffected by the scope of judicial review. Thus, even if a
defendant were confronted with the equivalent of a litigated judgment in the consent decree, the absence of the prima facie effect,
coupled with the cost saving of settlement, would often lead the defendant to opt for settlement instead of trial. 122 Third, the goal of
settlement is not an absolute one. The very purpose of judicial review is to ensure that settlements in conflict with the public interest
are not entered. If the Justice Department can negotiate only a bad
settlement, then the public interest will be better served by a trial on
the merits. 123 Congress has nowhere expressed an intention to encourage a court to accept an improper settlement as a means of preserving the consent decree as a settlement option. 124
118. Handler, supra note 105, at 241.
I 19. See notes 53-66 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the court cannot make
changes in the proposed decree without the consent of the parties. See note 2 supra; cf. text at
note 9 supra (court conditioned its approval of consent decree on parties' acceptance of
modifications).
120. 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS at 6539 (quoting 1973 SENATE REPORT,supra note 5, at 6). The phrase "public interest"
as used in the APPA includes "compromises made for non-substantive reasons inherent in the
process of settling cases through the consent decree procedure." 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1914 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6542.
121. M. GOLDBERG, supra note 3, at 3; 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 ("It is clear that
the substantial immunity from private antitrust actions is a primary consideration in defendants' willingness to negotiate consent decrees.").
122. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 n.2 (D. Mass. 1975),
where the parties "agreed that the court was not to weigh as one element of the settlement the
possibility that the government might have lost on the merits at trial. The decree is to be tested
on the basis of the relief provided, on the assumption that the government would have won."
Indeed, some defendants have consented to decrees that went beyond the relief the government could have obtained at trial, given the judicial precedents at that time. 1959 REPORT,
supra note 2, at 19; se~ e.g., United States v. A.B. Dick Co., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH)
~ 62,233, at 62,359 (N.D. Ohio 1948). InA.B. Dick Co., the consent decree contained a provision for royalty-free patent licensing, even though courts did not grant such relief in a litigated
judgment until several years later. See Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust
Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34, 49-50 (1950). This phenomenon suggests that
factors other than the severity of the relief embodied in the decree play a major role in defendants' decisions to settle.
123. Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 215-16.
124. The Senate and the House recognized that:
[T]he court must have broad discretion to acco=odate a balancing of interests. On the
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Intense judicial review does not affect the defendant's incentives
to settle. Thus, close judicial scrutiny of the terms of proposed consent decrees will not eviscerate the viability of consent decrees as an
alternative to trial.
B. Inadequate Knowledge

A second reason advanced against intense judicial review is the
court's inability, as a practical matter, to determine accurately the
public interest. 125 Not only does the court typically lack expertise in
the complex field of antitrust law, 126 but it may also be ignorant of
certain administrative factors 127 that motivated the Justice Department to settle its case. Given the paucity of the court's knowledge,
the argument goes, judicial deference is the better part of judicial
wisdom.
1. Substantive Knowledge
The argument concerning the court's lack of knowledge fails at
the start by ignoring the effect of the APPA; the Act enables a court,
with the cooperation of the Justice Department, to obtain enough
knowledge to stand as an informed representative of the public interest. Congress designed the APPA public comment procedures specifically to remedy any lack of judicial expertise. 128 A court can use
the public comments received during the APPA public notice period
one hand, the court must obtain the necessary information to make its determination that
the proposed decree is in the public interest. On the other hand, it must preserve the
consent decree as a viable settlement option.
1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
6538-39 (quoting 1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6).
125. See, e.g., S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 71 (statement of James S. Campbell, attorney).
126. See s. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 151 (testimony of J. Skelly Wright,
Judge, United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit) ("On the other hand . . . antitrust litigation is very complex litigation. Most Federal judges serve a lifetime on the bench without
trying one [antitrust] case and, consequently, they are really ignorant of the issues and even the
law, to some extent, involved in antitrust cases."); see also United States v. Ling-TemcoVought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (court forced to rely on stipulations of parties
and the assurances of the Justice Department that proposed decree protected the public interest in accordance with congressional design).
127. These factors typically include
the strength of the case on the law and the facts; the amount of resources that would be
tied up in full preparation for trial and in subsequent legal proceedings; the desirability or
necessity of obtaining significant relief rapidly; the value of any added increment of relief
that full litigation might produce as compared to the value of the alternative enforcement
efforts that could be carried out instead; and the effect that consent to a particular decree
might have on other cases, present and future, that are or might be arguably similar.
Letter from Donald F. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice, to Rep.
Emanuel Celler,reprintedin ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 297, at X-2 (Mar. 17,
1967).
128. See 119 CONG. REC. 24,600 (1973) (statement of Sen. Gurney). The public comment
procedure is designed to generate information that will improve the court's ability to evaluate
the decree from the perspective of the public interest. See note 11 supra.
'
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to educate itself about the effects of a proposed decree. 129 Congress
also provided various discretionary 130 procedural devices, such as
calling expert witnesses or appointing a special master, 131 which the
court can freely use to assist itself in making a competent determination of the public interest. 132
Although a court will be able to use the APPA procedures to
evaluate the effectiveness of the relief negotiated by the parties, critics of intense judicial review urge that the court lacks the knowledge
to determine whether a proposed decree is a good settlement without
investigating the relative strengths of the parties' legal positions. 133
Such an investigation of the government's chances of success at trial
might result in an extensive "minitrial" of the issues. 134 The court
might then frustrate the goal of rapid relief1 35 and might reduce incentives to settle. 136
These effects, however, will probably be minimal. A "minitrial"
still will be less costly and less time consuming than a full-scale
trial. 137 The defendant's strongest incentive to settle - avoidance of
the prima facie effect 138 - remains intact. Also, the problem does
not even arise when the Justice Department reveals to the court the
reasons behind its willingness to accept less than the remedy it had
originally sought. 139 Presumably, the Department would be even
more diligent in doing so in the face of intense judicial review.
2. Resource Allocation

The court's lack of knowledge may create a second problem. The
court cannot match the expertise of the Attorney General in the
management and allocation of the Justice Department's resources. 140
129. Senator Gurney stated that "[t]he extra time and additional information that the bill
thus requires is for the purpose of encouraging, and in some cases soliciting additional information and public comment that will assist the court in deciding whether the decree should be
granted." 119 CONG. REc. 24,600 (1973).
130. ll8 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1972) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(l)-(2) (1982).
132. Senator Tunney emphasized the importance of the interplay between these procedures and the court's public interest review when he stated that "in a very few complex cases,
failure to use some of the procedures might give rise to an indication that the district court had
failed to exercise its discretion properly." 119 CONG. REc. 3453 (1973).
133. See notes 125-27 supra and accompanying text.
134. S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 78 (statement of James S. Campbell,
attorney).
135. Id.
136. See text at note I 18 supra.
137. See note ll7 supra.
138. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
139. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREE MANUAL 5
(1979).
140. H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 142 (statement of Miles W. Kirkpatrick,
attorney).
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Factors such as the potential strain on the Department's capabilities
of litigating a particular case might prompt the government to accept
a less-than-ideal settlement in order to free its resources for use elsewhere. A settlement that appears inadequate in isolation could produce a net gain for society by improving the overall efficiency of
antitrust enforcement. 141 A court's denial of approval could frustrate the Department's efficiency.
Even granting the theory of this argument, 142 any misallocation
of resources caused by intense judicial review is likely to be insignificant. A court's denial of approval will result in substantial reallocation of resources only if a trial ensues. But the court's denial of
approval does not necessarily mean that a trial must follow. Each of
the parties to a proposed consent decree manifests its willingness, if
not its desire, to settle 143 the case, and renegotiation of the settlement
by the parties to make the decree compatible with the public interest
would remain a viable alternative to litigation. 144
If renegotiation proves unproductive, the Justice Department
could dismiss a case in the face of a court's denial of a proposed
decree. 145 Such dismissals need not jeopardize effective antitrust en141. H. HEARINGS ON APPA,supra note 54, at 127 (statement of Howard R. Lurie, Professor of Law).
142. Zimmer and Sullivan, supra note 3, at 207, point out that there are numerous theoretical and practical defects in the administrative process that at least make it doubtful whether
the Justice Department is the best judge of its own resource allocation. Intense judicial review,
therefore, conceivably would improve the efficiency of the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, there is no necessary dichotomy between decisions made by the courts and by
the Justice Department: The legislative history of the APPA should make the courts sensitive
to the efficient allocation of the Department's resources in making their public interest determinations. The phrase "public interest" as used in the APPA includes "compromises made for
nonsubstantive reasons inherent in the process of settling cases through the consent decree
procedure." 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS at 6542. The courts should regard the proper allocation of the Justice Department's
resources as one such nonsubstantive factor.
143. See JJT .Dividend, supra note 96, at 614 n.132.
144. For examples under the APPA where the parties have returned to the bargaining
table at the request of the court and have come back with an acceptable settlement, see
Branfman, supra note 30, at 350 n.180.
145. Two courts recently held that the APPA procedures do not apply to stipulated dismissals. In In re International Business Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982), the circuit
court granted a writ of mandamus directing the district court to cease consideration of the
question whether the APPA applies to a stipulated dismissal. The circuit court found no indication in the Act itself or in the legislative history that Congress intended the APPA to apply to
dismissals. 687 F.2d at 601-02. Indeed, as the following dialogue indicates, the bill's sponsor
thought of stipulated dismissals as an alternative to settlements falling within the scope of the
APPA:
MR. HUTCHINSON. Would any kind of consent decree need to have the court's
approval?
MR. TUNNEY. Right.
MR. HUTCHINS. Would any kind of agreement made outside the court privately stand?
MR. TUNNEY. Well, I certainly do not think so. / suppose the Justice .Department could
drop the suit. That would be a third alternative. Otherwise the Justice Department could
proceed with the litigation or come in with a new consent [decree] and attempt to get the
Judge's approval of that decree.
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forcement. Dismissals entered without prejudice do not prevent subsequent administrations from initiating litigation to regulate and
restrain continuing anticompetitive behavior of the defendant. 146
But the reluctance of courts to modify any consent decree once it is
entered 147 means that inadequate injunctive provisions embodied in
a decree will operate in perpetuity and may in effect foreclose further
regulation of the defendant's practices. 148 On balance, then, a dismissal might be preferable to entry of an ineffective consent
decree. 149
In fact, the prospect of judicially imposed renegotiations or
subsequent "voluntary" dismissal could improve the Justice Department's performance in effectuating antitrust policies. The
knowledge that a court will closely scrutinize the terms of a proposed
settlement provides an incentive for the Justice Department to exercise care 150 in arriving at a settlement in the first place. 151 The
H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 43 (emphasis added). Several other witnesses testified to the same effect. 687 F.2d at 602.
In United States v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. 547 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1982), the district court similarly concluded that the APPA did not apply to a stipulated dismissal. Besides relying on the legislative history of the APPA, the court advanced three additional arguments. First, the court explained that "to apply the APPA to dismissals would be to
disregard the apparent understanding of Congress as to the then-existing judicial practice regarding consent decrees and the effect of the changes being made. Prior to the passage of the
APPA, entry of consent decrees was already considered to be a judicial act requiring the
judge's approval." 547 F. Supp. at 401; see 1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. In
contrast, stipulated dismissals are ordinarily entered without the need for court approval. FED,
R. CIV. P. 4l(a)(l). Congress' understanding that no major changes were being made cannot
be reconciled with inclusion of dismissals within the coverage of the APPA. 547 F. Supp. at
401. Second, dismissals entered without prejudice do not bar later administrations from reinstituting suit. An effective suit later is preferable to approval of an inadequate settlement now,
a settlement that could hinder subsequent attempts by different administrations to regulate the
defendant's behavior. 547 F. Supp. at 400-01. Finally, application of the APPA to dismissals
could violate the constitutional separation of powers. Nothing less than a clear congressional
mandate should lead a court to wade through such a "constitutional morass." 547 F. Supp. at
401.
146. United States v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 399, 400-01
(N.D. Cal. 1982).
147. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) ("Nothing less than a clear
showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to. change
what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned."). See also notes
79-83 supra and accompanying text.
148. See 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
149. See S. HEARINGS ON APPA,supra note 25, at 76-77 (statement of James S. Campbell,
attorney).
150. The Justice Department, for instance, may be less likely to "compromise[ ) its economic objectives for the sake of expediency," 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 303, if it thinks the
court would not approve of such concessions. The Department might also be less likely to
"knuckl[e) under'' to the defendants, as the Supreme Court found the Department had done in
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. 129, 141 {1967) (decree
completely failed to remedy the situation found to violate the antitrust laws). See also United
States v. First Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1967) ("about a ninety
percent capitulation" by the Justice Department), qffd. mem. sub nom. Central Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968). When it enacted the APPA, Congress was particularly concerned about decrees that commentators deemed "devoid of merit" (referring to the
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court's status as a disinterested party in the litigation allows it objectively to assess the relationship between the decree and the public
interest. And the resources available to it under the APPA 152 enable
the court to educate itself about the decree to ensure that the decree
promotes the goals of antitrust policy by protecting the public
interest.
CONCLUSION

No practical or theoretical obstacle limits a court's power or ability to evaluate intensely and independently consent decrees proposed
as settlements of public, civil antitrust suits. By using the tools at its
disposal under the APPA, the court can stand as an informed representative of the public and as an effective check against errors made
by the Justice Department in negotiating settlements. The congressional intent for the APPA, the importance of consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, and the significance of antitrust settlements to
the public at large all demand that courts accept their equitable and
statutory responsibility to enter as judgments only consent decrees
that protect the public interest. This responsibility calls for independent and intense review of proposed decrees.

infamous AT&T-Western Electric decree entered in 1956) and "blatantly inequitable and improper." See 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
151. See S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 148.
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(f) (1982).

